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sional exemption regardless of their belief in an orthodox God, be-
cause this is the only way that the nation can benefit from their sin-
cerity.
The Welsh decision does not represent an attempt to enforce the
letter of the congressional will. Rather, it is an attempt to preserve
the practical thrust of § 60) without interpreting it so narrowly as to
raise grave first amendment doubts. The end result is a construction
of the statute that is undoubtedly offensive to some. But one that is
quite valid given the reason for exemptions based on conscientious
objection.
William C. Bartley
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-FELONY MURDER RULE-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, utilizing language indicating dissatisfaction with the
felony murder rule,' has expressly overruled its prior decision in Com-
monwealth v. Almeida.2
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550
(1970).
On January 30, 1947, James Smith, along with Edward Hough and
David Almeida, engaged in the armed robbery of a Philadelphia super-
market. An off-duty police officer was shot and killed while attempting
to frustrate the escape of the felons. Evidence as to whether one of the
'felons fired the shot resulting in the officer's death was conflicting at
the trial level; the court however, charged the jury that the identity of
the individual who fired the shot was irrelevant:
Even if you should find from the evidence that Ingling was killed
by a bullet from the gun of one of the policemen, that policeman
having shot at the felons in an attempt to prevent the robbery or
the escape of the robbers, or to protect Ingling, the felons would
be guilty of murder, or if they did that in returning the fire of
the felons that was directed toward them.3
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree,
with punishment fixed at imprisonment for life.
I. In Pennsylvania, the felony murder rule punishes as first degree, all murders which
shall be committed in the perpetration of, or in attempting to perpetrate any arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1939).
2. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
3. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 220, 261 A.2d 550i 558 (1970).-
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On an appeal nunc pro tunc4 the appellant asserted that he was
denied.due process of law by virtue of the. trial court's charge that it
was irrelevant who fired the fatal shot.
The court agreed with appellant overruling its decision in A lmeida.5
The significance of the court's decision however, is not the expressed
repudiation of its decision laid down twenty-one years previously, since
Commonwealth v. Redline unquestionably limited the applicable scope
of Ameida to the facts from which it arose.6
The significance of the decision is the language utilized by the court
in discussing the felony murder rule generally and at arriving at a
decision.
The court's language unquestionably indicates its discontent with
the felony murder rule, the premises on which it rests, and its deterrent
effect on crime.
The possible impact of this language will be subsequently considered.
The felony murder rule appears to have originated in 1536 when a
group of men in attempting to steal certain property killed another
in the attempt and were convicted of murder.7
Under a doctrine of constructive malice, the predecessor of the
felony murder rule, malice was apparently imputed from the underly-
ing felony to the homicide.
This principle of law was adopted by Pennsylvania in 1681,8 and on
April 22, 1794, the Pennsylvania Assembly statutorily enacted what has
come more popularly to be known as the felony murder rule.9
4. A phrase applied to acts allowed to be done after the time when they should be
done, with retroactive effect.
5. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
6. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
7. Mansell and Herbert's Case, 2 Dyer 128b, 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1536).
8. CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN AND LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENN-
SYLVANIA, PASSED BETWEEN THE YEARS 1682 AND 1700 at 84. (Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 1879.)
9. "Sect. I. Be it enacted by the SENATE and HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES of
the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met, and it is hereby enacted
by the authority of the same, That no crime whatsoever, hereafter committed (except
murder of the first degree) shall be punished with death in the state of Pennsylvania.
Sect. I. And whereas the several offenses, which are included under the general de-
nomination of murder, differ so greatly from each other in the degree of their atrocious-
ness that it is unjust to involve them in the same punishment: Be it further enacted'
by the Authority aforesaid, That all murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of
poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated
killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all
other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree; before whom any
person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof,
ascertain in their verdict, whether it be murder of the first orsecond degree; but if such
person shall be convicted by confession, the court shall proceed, by examination of wit-
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The enacting portion of the original statute remains unchanged with
the exception of the addition of kidnapping as an enumerated felony.10
Judicially, the felony murder rule in Pennsylvania was consistently
interpreted and applied against defendants when the killing was done
by either the defendant or an accomplice or by one acting in fur-
therance of the felonious undertaking." However, in 1947, the court
extended its prior application of the rule to encompass homicides
committed by third persons in attempting to defend their property or
themselves from the felonious scheme.'2
In 1949, the court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v.
Moyer's3 affirmed the first degree murder conviction of David Almeida.
By applying the proximate cause concept of criminal liability the de-
fendant's guilt for a killing possibly done not by himself or one of
his co-felons but by a police officer in an attempt to frustrate the
felony was held to constitute murder in the first degree.' 4
In 1955, and again in 1958, the court extended the reach of the felony
murder rule to hold criminally liable the surviving felon for the death
of a co-felon; caused directly by the victim of the felonious scheme, 15
or by the co-felon himself.'6
It is apparent from these decisions that Pennsylvania had created a
felony murder rule that could easily encompass any homicide proxi-
mately connectable to an enumerated felony and the courts could there-
fore convict felons of murder in the first degree not only for the
homicides which they themselves committed but for homicides com-
mitted by any other person who was attempting to oppose the felonious
scheme simply by establishing a causal connection between the original
felonious undertaking and the resultant death.
Whatever the court's motivation for creating such an all-encompass-
ing doctrine, it was obviously not present when the court handed down
its decision in Commonwealth v. Redline.17 The decision in the Redline
nesses, to determine the degree of the crime, and to give sentence accordingly." Act of
April 22, 1794, ch. MDCCLXVI, §§ I & II.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1939)."
11. Commonwealth v. Major, 198 Pa. 290, 47 A. 741 (1901); Commonwealth v. Grether,
204 Pa. 203, 53 A. 753 (1902); Commonwealth v. McManus, 282 Pa. 25, 127 A. 316 (1925);
Commonwealth v. Tauza, 300 Pa. 375,.150 A. 649 (1930); Commonwealth v. Elliott, 349 Pa.
488, 37 A.2d 582 (1944); Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 328 (1947).
12. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
13. Id.
14. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
15. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A2d 204 (1955).
16. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958).
17.. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391. Pa. -486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
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case expressly overruled the prior decision in Commonwealth v.
Thomas.I8 Both cases concerned the criminal liability of the surviving
felon when his co-felon was killed by a third person.
The majority in Redline considered Commonwealth v. Thomas an
unwarranted judicial extension of the felony murder rule. The court
went on to say that the decision in Commonwealth v. Almeida'9 was
distinguishable from the Thomas and Redline factual situations since
in the latter cases the felon was killed by a police officer and therefore
the homicide was justifiable; whereas in Almeida an innocent third
party was killed by the police officer and such a homicide is only ex-
cusable and continues to fall within the applicable reach of the rule.20
Not until the case of note was A Imeida expressly overruled. However,
as stated previously, the significance of the decision is possibly more
far-reaching than the expressed repudiation of Almeida.
Justice O'Brien, speaking for the majority, makes mention of the
harsh criticism to which the felony murder rule has been subjected
and concedes that most of the criticism is thoroughly warranted.
Using language borrowed from Redline, the majority stated that the
most plausible explanation of the rule's origin was that at early common
law many crimes, including practically all felonies were punishable by
death; therefore it was of little significance whether the convicted de-
fendant was punished for the initial felony or the homicide accidentally
resulting from the felony.2'
The court in its own language stated that "not only is the felony
murder rule non-essential but it is very doubtful that it has the
deterrent effect its proponents assert. On the contrary, it appears that
juries rebel against convictions, adopting a homemade rule against
fortuities, where a conviction must result in life imprisonment. If
added deterrence is desired, the felony murder rule is not the right
approach."22
The court then stated that the purpose of this discussion was not to
abolish the rule but to emphasize the weak premises on which it rests
and to restrain it to its characteristic application. 23
This language, admittedly dictum, cannot however pass without
18. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204- (1955).
19. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
20. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
21. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 458 Pa. 218, 225, 261 A.2d 550, 554 (1970).
22. Id. at 226, 261 A.2d at 554.
23. Id. at 227, 261 A.2d at 555.
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notice. Over a period of approximately 23 years the court has departed
from the characteristic approach of applying the rule only to homicides
committed by the felonious perpetrators themselves to a concept of
imputing criminal liability under a concept of proximate causation
and has with the decision of note finally returned to the characteristic
application, and by dictum indicated its dissatisfaction with this ap-
plication.
The felony murder rule characteristically applied, punishes as first
degree murder those homicides committed by the perpetrators or at-
tempted perpetrators of a proscribed felony24 without the necessity of
proving the relation between the homicide and the offender's mental
state of mind. All other homicides punished similarly require the ho-
micide be wilful, premeditated, and deliberate.2 5
It is this aspect of the doctrine that has prompted much comment.
The doctrine has been criticized as broadening the scope of first
degree murder by supplying the requisite mental state in law that
may not exist in fact. 26 The phrase "constructive murder" is the
essence of the rule. The felony murder rule is a tool for creating the
mens rea of murder.27
An obvious example of this is where the fleeing perpetrator of a
bank robbery falls, accidentally discharging his revolver, resulting in
the death of a bank teller. Had the same factual situation occurred,
not in the perpetration of a statutorily enumerated felony but as the
result of an accidental fall in the bank by an individual legally per-
mitted to carry a weapon, the killing would constitute only excusable
homicide. However, due to the felony murder doctrine the former
situation would constitute murder in the first degree, punishable in
Pennsylvania by death or imprisonment for life.28
It has been stated that this undermines the principle of culpability
based on mental state of mind and basic to our law is the principle that
punishment, no matter what its theoretical justification, should be in
proportion to culpability. 29
In contrast, the felony murder rule has been considered by certain
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1939)..
25. Id.
26. Note, Felony Murder as a First Degree Offense: An Anachronism Retained,
66 YALE L.J. 427 (1957).
27. Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L.
RFv. 50 (1956).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1939).
29. Supra note 26.
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members of the judiciary to be a necessary rule in the criminal preven-
tion arsenal.
In A lmeida the majority stated that when robbers. arm themselves
they indicate their expectations of forcible opposition and have pre-
pared themselves to kill those in their way. If they do cause death
they should be adjudged guilty of murder in the first degree.3 0
In his dissenting opinion in Redline, Justice Bell, now Chief Justice
Bell, expressed his opinion that the brutal crime wave sweeping our
country necessitates that a broad rule of felony murder prevail in order
to protect society from criminals.3 '
The problems presented by the felony murder rule and its concept
of punishment, not commensurate, in most cases, with the perpetrator's
mental state, has prompted legislative action in other jurisdictions in
an attempt to remedy and more closely proportionate the perpetrators
culpability with the punishment statutorily dictated.
England, the jurisdiction responsible for the creation of the doctrine
of felony murder, in 1957, legislatively attempted to solve the problem.
The English Homicide Act of 1957 has abolished the concept of con-
structive malice. For a conviction of murder, the statute requires "the
same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a
killing to amount to murder when not done in the course or further
ance of another offense. ' 3
2
In this country, Wisconsin has statutorily modified the common law
30. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 634, 68 A.2d 595, 614 (1949).
31. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 514, 137 A.2d 472, 483 (1958): "The brutal
crime wave which is sweeping and appalling our Country can be halted only if the courts
stop coddling, and stop freeing murderers, communists and criminals on technicalities made
of straw. The Courts seem to have forgotten that Justice is not a one-way street-law-
abiding citizens and law-abiding communities are entitled, at least equally with criminals,
to the protection of the law.
"The felony murder doctrine was clearly and well established in Pennsylvania by legal
principles which are several hundred years old and in particular by five decisions of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down in the last ten years which are directly
in point and sustain, without the slightest doubt, the conviction of this murder (Redline).
Faith in Justice, and confidence and trust in our Courts are seriously impaired when
these recent and notable decisions of the Court, as well as long established principles
of law are repudiated and overruled or discarded-not for the protection of society or
for any other worthy objective, but to give further protection to individuals who are
defying our laws, destroying the peace and jeopardizing the welfare of our communities."
32. The English Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11 provides:
"1. Abolition of 'constructive malice'.-(l) Where a person kills another in the course
or furtherance of some other offense, the killing shall not amount to murder unless
done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing
to amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another offense.
"(2) For the purpose of the foregoing subsection, a killing done in the course or for
the purpose of resisting an officer of justice, or of resisting or avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest, or of effecting or assisting an escape or rescue from legal custody, shall
be treated as a killing in the course or furtherance of an offense."
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felony murder doctrine by preserving the basic concept of culpability
for death caused in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony, but has reduced the degree and punishment of the crime. 3
Similarly, Minnesota has statutorily reduced the degree and punish-
ment for homicides committed in the perpetration or attempted per-
petration of certain felonies.8 4
The American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code has, however,
retained felony murder of the first degree but the language of the Code
creates only a presumption of the elements necessary for a first degree
conviction. Such a presumption could apparently be overcome by evi-
dence establishing the homicide as accidental.3 5
Whether similar steps will be taken in Pennsylvania to alter or
abolish entirely the felony murder rule is a question unanswerable at
this time. Considering however, the steps taken in other jurisdictions
and the criticism to which the rule in its characteristic application has
been subjected, the dictum of the instant case may be an indication of
the court's attitude toward the destiny of the felony murder rule in
Pennsylvania.
J. Alan Johnson
33. THIRD-DEGREE MURDER. Whoever in the course of committing or attempting to
commit a felony causes the death of another human being as a natural and probable
consequence of the commission of or attempt to commit the felony, may be imprisoned
not more than 15 years in excess of the maximum provided by law for the felony.
Wis. STAT. § 940.03 (1967).
34. MURDER IN THE THIRD DEGREE. Whoever, without intent to effect the death of
any person, causes the death of another- by either of the following -means, is guilty of
murder in the third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
25 years:
(1) Perpetrates an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind,
regardless of human life; or
(2) Commits or attempts to commit a felony upon or affecting the person whose death
was caused or another, except rape or sodomy with force or violence within the meaning
of Section 609.185. MINN. STAT. § 609.195 (1963).
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 (Tent. Draft 8, 9, 10, 1960)
Murder.
(1) Except as provided in Section 201.3(l)(b), criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor
is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing robbery, rape by force or intimidation, arson, burglary, kidnapping
or felonious escape.
(2) Murder is a felony of the first degree (but a person convicted of murder may be
sentenced to death, as provided in Section 201.6). -
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